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The Orange Revolution: Round Two 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko opened the parliamentary election 
campaign by firing Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, sparking debate as to 
whether this action would instigate open war between the two or whether the 
former Orange Revolution partners would find a way to coexist 
peacefully. Signals suggest that war will be the mode of operation until the 
parliamentary elections in March. The war scenario could provide new life to 
those who appeared so discredited just eight months ago, while disillusioning a 
citizenry that had just begun to believe in a government “for the people.” 
 
However, this scenario should concern Western officials. Yushchenko should be 
made to understand that strong actions, not just words, are necessary to 
demonstrate his commitment to honest, fair, accountable government. At the 
moment, a perception is developing—true or not—that this commitment may be 
wavering. This perception has grown in part, because Yushchenko has chosen to 
attack his former prime minister in lieu of aggressively examining corruption 
allegations leveled at his closest aides. 
 
On Tuesday, Yushchenko lashed out at Tymoshenko, suggesting that she had 
attempted to use her position to eliminate $1.5 billion in debts that he said had 
been incurred by a company she owned in the 1990s. (1) The company, United 
Energy Systems of Ukraine (UES), made Tymoshenko one of the richest people 
in the country–although some observers suggest Tymoshenko walked the edge 
of the law to gather much of that money.  
 
UES was broken up by government officials during the Kuchma era after 
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Tymoshenko began an opposition movement against the then-president. Both 
Russian and Kuchma-controlled Ukrainian law enforcement bodies attempted to 
jail Tymoshenko at that time, based on events surrounding, among other things, 
the debts of UES. While he was in parliament, Yushchenko fought these 
efforts. Tymoshenko claimed strenuously that all charges against her were 
politically motivated, and despite years of investigation, neither Russian nor 
Kuchma officials publicly produced any credible evidence to the contrary. For his 
part, Viktor Yushchenko stated his support for Tymoshenko–until now. 
 
Tymoshenko quickly responded to Yushchenko¹s charge, saying that her 
company had no debts to forgive. She suggested that Yushchenko was “picking 
up [former President Leonid] Kuchma¹s baton and trying to get rid of me in the 
same way.” (2) Her statement is given some added, if possibly coincidental, 
credibility by a recent meeting between Acting Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov 
and former President Leonid Kuchma in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine. The two, 
according to the Financial Times, “greeted each other with broad smiles and 
kisses on the cheek.” (3) Later, Kuchma praised Yushchenko’s decision to fire 
the cabinet, calling it “absolutely correct,” and calling on his supporters not to 
oppose the president. (4) The specter of Kuchma as Yushchenko’s new ally and 
Tymoshenko as his new opponent will undoubtedly raise the eyebrows of many 
who protested on Yushchenko’s behalf as he stood hand-in-hand with 
Tymoshenko against Kuchma during the Orange Revolution. 
 
The financial questions about Tymoshenko and UES may or may not be true, 
and should be independently investigated. It is worth noting, however, that 
Yushchenko’s claim appeared on the same day that Tymoshenko suggested she 
will run against him for president in 2009 and contradicts Yushchenko’s earlier 
statements that he had wanted Tymoshenko to remain in his government. It 
therefore could be perceived as persecution against an opponent rather than an 
honest attempt to root out corruption. 
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With these recriminations against Tymoshenko, it is easy to forget that the 
political crisis that ended in her dismissal began not with corruption charges 
against her, but with corruption charges against the president’s closest aides. 
 
On 3 September, Yushchenko’s Chief of Staff and former Campaign Manager 
Oleksandr Zinchenko resigned, charging that the president’s closest aides were 
corrupt. In particular, Zinchenko singled out National Security and Defense 
Council Secretary Petro Poroshenko, Presidential Aide Oleksandr Tretyakov, and 
the head of Yushchenko’s political party, Mykola Martynenko.  
 
Zinchenko’s statement has not been distributed extensively throughout the 
mainstream Western press. Below is a rather long but illustrative passage:  
 
“A small group of adventurists is trying to take advantage of the 
achievements of last autumn, of the wishes and desires of the entire 
people, or the heroic efforts of the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian 
patriots. They have set up their own clan, they have orchestrated an 
information blockade of the president and pushed him into a virtual, 
unreal world, they have cynically twisted the real situation, neglecting 
the hopes of their compatriots. Step by step they are implementing their 
plan to use power for their own enrichment, to privatize and grab 
everything they can. They want a monopoly, they want to take over 
instruments of power as soon as they can. … I will name just a few. The 
secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Petro 
Poroshenko, first presidential aide Tretyakov, and some of their partners, 
such as Martynenko, are cynically implementing their scenario of using 
power for their own purposes. This scenario has the following main 
points: property, judiciary, law-enforcement agencies, personnel policy, 
media and power. It was Poroshenko who insisted on, and finally 
managed to illegally subordinate the judiciary to the National Security 
and Defense Council, even though it is by definition independent. … 
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“I asked the president several times to stop Poroshenko. At [my] last 
meetings with Yushchenko, removing Poroshenko and his team from 
their posts was the condition of my further work in the president’s team. 
… Why didn’t I speak about this earlier? Under the circumstances, I 
tried to preserve the unity of the team. … But everyone has a choice. 
One can put up with this and share the profits. … I cannot and do not 
want to put up with this shameful violation of the law. I made my choice 
at Independence Square.” (5) 
 
Zinchenko’s charges were unsurprising to many observers of Yushchenko’s 
administration. For months, some Western officials privately complained of the 
growing influence of Poroshenko and Tretyakov, at the expense of the prime 
minister’s office, and have been concerned about persistent signs, although 
unproven, that Poroshenko was mixing politics with business. However, they had 
expressed the hope that the situation could be dealt with quietly, without 
damaging the fragile trust given to Yushchenko and Tymoshenko by the voters of 
Ukraine. This was not to be the case. 
 
Charges by Zinchenko and others against Poroshenko included that he and/or 
his allies had pressured judges for verdicts in his or his friends’ favor, had 
circumvented customs regulations to receive favorable conditions for his 
business products, and had brokered a deal for the sale of a television station to 
an ally by using threats of legal persecution. Poroshenko strenuously denied all 
of these charges, but the damage was done. 
 
It soon became clear that Poroshenko would need to resign. He did so, but only 
when the cabinet also was dismissed–a decision that shifted the focus away from 
him. 
 
When announcing the cabinet’s dismissal, Yushchenko cited a need to end the 
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public turf battles that had developed between Tymoshenko and Poroshenko, 
and accused the government (which was interpreted to mean Tymoshenko) of 
lacking “team spirit.” He suggested that Tymoshenko’s policies had led to a drop 
in economic growth, and that she had bungled the reprivatization of enterprises 
that previously were sold illegally. At the same time, he announced Poroshenko’s 
resignation and Tretyakov’s suspension, but noted that he believed the charges 
against them were “groundless.” (6) 
 
Yushchenko’s comments also made clear that it was not corruption or economic 
concerns, but politics, that eventually led to Tymoshenko’s dismissal. He 
lamented that, following three days of intensive negotiations, he had made an 
agreement with Tymoshenko that would have kept her in the prime minister¹s 
chair. But at the last minute, he said, she had pulled out. “Yesterday, I spent all 
day and night trying to produce the best possible answer–if the team spirit does 
exist, we should remain together. Such an agreement was reached. 
Unfortunately, things changed overnight. But it was not I who changed them,” he 
said. (7) 
 
Individuals close to the negotiations suggest Yushchenko’s team was concerned 
that the government balance of power would shift to Tymoshenko if Poroshenko 
resigned. Therefore, they insisted on a signed guarantee that she would support 
Yushchenko in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections before 
announcing Poroshenko’s resignation. This contention seems to be supported by 
Yushchenko’s new Chief of Staff Oleksandr Rybachuk. “A formula of political 
cooperation with quotas, agreements and guarantees for the forthcoming 
parliamentary elections, which gives a clear outlook for the next five years” was 
developed, he said, but not signed by Tymoshenko. Therefore, “Yushchenko had 
no choice, but to accept the Cabinet¹s resignation.” (8) 
 
Tymoshenko in turn complained that she could not sign an agreement in which 
Yushchenko could veto anyone’s inclusion on the electoral list, even her closest 
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allies, for a campaign in which Poroshenko may continue to play a pivotal role. 
(9) 
 
She also suggested that Yushchenko was frustrated that she would neither 
publicly denounce Zinchenko nor express confidence in those he had accused. 
“The first condition is that I have to extend my hand not to the president but to his 
team–Poroshenko, Martynenko, Tretyakov, Bezsmertnyy–that I should give them 
my hand,” she said. “But how could I extend my hand to them if their hands are 
constantly busy stealing something?” (10) 
 
She emphasized that she did not believe the president himself was corrupt, and 
has gone out of her way in public statements to separate him from “his 
environment.” Regardless, the details of these negotiations suggest that 
economic concerns and corruption charges against Tymoshenko were not 
foremost in anyone¹s mind as her fate was being decided. 
 
By replacing the strong-willed prime minister with an unquestioning, close ally, 
Yushchenko will likely reach his goal to create a more unified public government 
face. But what of the corruption allegations against his aides?  
 
Many within Ukraine questioned whether the cabinet’s dismissal was a pretext to 
divert attention from the corruption charges, or even more, to weaken a potential 
rival just six months before pivotal parliamentary elections. Now, Yushchenko’s 
new allegations against Tymoshenko, made public after he was asked about the 
decision to fire her, and echoing those brought during the discredited Kuchma 
administration, raise new doubts. 
 
If Yushchenko fired Tymoshenko because she was corrupt, why was his first 
choice for her to remain in his government? Why did he wait more than four days 
to mention this particular concern? Why, when discussing this alleged corruption, 
does he not also refer to the allegations against his aides? 
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And most importantly, why was it necessary to replace the cabinet now, weeks 
before the deadline for completion of negotiations for entrance into the World 
Trade Organization, and days before the 2006 budget must be submitted to 
parliament? 
 
Some commentators and analysts have simply sighed with relief that the public 
battles between Poroshenko and Tymoshenko will now be over. But was it 
necessary to dismiss the entire cabinet to end these battles? Could Yushchenko 
have better defined the duties of his team, asserted his authority, dealt with 
corruption within his own administration and preserved the unity of the governing 
coalition? 
 
Other commentators have cheered that Tymoshenko’s “populist” politics will end. 
Clearly, Tymoshenko deserves some criticism–particularly for her often rash 
handling of the “reprivatization” issue. However, it is important to note that many 
economic policies now criticized by Yushchenko were originally supported, either 
partially or wholly, by him. (11) While Tymoshenko certainly made mistakes and 
enemies, she did not make all of them alone. And it is unfair to suggest that 
everything she did was incorrect or that every negative event should be 
attributable solely to her. 
 
Regardless of Tymoshenko’s negatives or positives, the Ukrainian president 
must remember that the crisis that ended with her dismissal began with 
corruption allegations against others. Yushchenko should ensure an independent 
investigation of the charges against Tymoshenko, and if evidence is found to 
support the charges, she should be prosecuted. If no evidence is found, she 
should not. He must do the same for the charges against his aides. Each 
individual, whether friend or opponent, should have equal access to findings of 
both guilt and innocence. Selective prosecution or non-prosecution must be a 
thing of the past. So far, the president’s efforts have raised some concerns. 
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Yushchenko said he will personally oversee the investigation into all corruption 
claims–even apparently those involving Poroshenko, who is a long-time friend 
and the godfather to one of his children. The president has ordered a quickly 
formed “state commission” to present its findings on “who in this country is 
involved in corruption” in ten days. (12) The Security Service will reportedly 
announce “first conclusions” this week. Oversight of a corruption investigation by 
the president, in a country with a history of political interference in law 
enforcement, sends a dubious and perhaps unintended signal. This is especially 
true when the president has already given his personal assessment of the claims. 
 
The corruption crisis has the potential to undermine Western trust. But more 
important, it has the potential to disillusion the hundreds of thousands of 
Ukrainians who stood in the cold for weeks listening to Yushchenko promise an 
end to lawlessness. In a new democracy, disillusionment, apathy, and anger are 
destructive.  
 
In the months following the Orange Revolution, Ukraine made some important 
strides on its path to democracy. The press is freer. The number of private 
entrepreneurs has risen, as the environment is slowly cleared of bureaucracy. 
State salaries have increased and are now paid on time. Investment is gradually 
improving. Yushchenko, Tymoshenko and their allies should be commended for 
this progress. 
 
It is this progress that, ironically, allowed the current crisis to develop. A 
corruption scandal could never have toppled anyone last year in Ukraine. This 
year, the uncensored media reaction to Zinchenko¹s charges, the monitoring of 
government activity, the pressure from international organizations being courted 
by Ukraine, and most of all, the understanding by many government officials that 
they must be accountable, all forced the government to act. Ukraine is not the 
same place in 2005 that it was in 2004. A stronger signal from Yushchenko that 
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he will not abide corruption anywhere around him would demonstrate that 
progress is continuing, and would once again confirm the Ukrainian people¹s 
faith in him. 
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